#### Turn: deconstruction is the only way to question epistemology practically that’s scheper hughes- noticing little every day and peacetimes violences that both were and are committed every day is the only way to prevent bigger atrocities such as what happened to indigenous peoples.

#### No link: don’t let them get away with generic links or links of omission, we have to further exclude to link to their k- our scheper hughes 4 and Johnson 10 card are great at questioning both small violences and the precautionary principle- where we use defensive measures to secure ourselves against perceived enemies such as indigenous peoples.

#### The alt serves as an act of memory that forecloses the possibility of healing through countermemory. The aff is a necessary balance between remembering and forgetting that allows for healing after atrocity.

Minow ’99 Martha Minow is the Jeremiah Smith, Jr. Professor of Law and the Dean of [Harvard Law School](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvard_Law_School) Between Vengence and Forgiveness Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence 1999 (118-120)

After mass atrocity, what can and should be faced about the past? World denying experiences defy description and perhaps even memory; yet refusing to remember even this can risk insulting the victimized and leaving rage to fester. To seek a path between vengeance and forgiveness is also to seek a route between too much memory and too much forgetting. Too much memory is a disease, comments Michael Roth. 1 Charles Maier argues that Americans in particular have "become addicted to memory," making modern American politics "a competition for enshrining grievances."2 Philosopher Hermann Lubbe argued that suppression of the Nazi past through amnesty and amnesia permitted West Germany in the 1950 to build a stable democracy.3 Yet Jean Baudrillard explains that "[f]orgetting the extermination is part of the extermination itself."4 Journalist Tina Rosenberg concluded from her investigations in Eastern Europe and Latin America that "[n]ations, like individuals, need to face up to and understand traumatic past events before they can put them aside and move on to normal life."5 Milan Kundera's phrase has come to summarize resistance against totalitarianism: "The struggle against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting."6 Timothy Garton Ash argues that "victims and their relatives have a moral right to know at whose hands they or their loved ones suffered." In addition, memory becomes a political tool: "Dirty fragments of the past constantly resurface and are used, often dirtily, in current political disputes." 7

The alternation of forgetting and remembering itself etches the path of power. William Gladstone is said to have commented that "the cause of the problem in Ireland is that the Irish will never forget and the British will never remember."8 According to historian Patrice Higgonet, French leaders in the nineteenth century conveyed to the nation a commitment to remember and hate the French Revolution and its terror as a form of expiation, while politicians and ordinary citizens in France today treat the Terror as a historical misfortune that one should try to forget.9

The double edged dangers of too much and too little memory lead contemporary figures to make paradoxical calls about remembering the past. Dullah Omar, South Africa's justice minister, exhorts "we want to put the past behind us but we don't want to forget, we want to remember."10 In his afterword to Death and the Maiden, the chilling play of post terror revenge and justice, Ariel Dorfman writes, "How do we keep the past alive without becoming its prisoner? How do we forget it without risking its repetition in the future?"11 Even a contemporary children's book tells of a young elephant who must learn to remember what to forget; notably, he must remember to forget another elephant's injurious but accidental assault and violation of rules in order to remember their fundamental brotherhood.12

Living after genocide, mass atrocity, totalitarian terror, however, makes remembering and forgetting not just about dealing with the past. The treatment of the past through remembering and forgetting crucially shapes the present and future for individuals and entire societies. Mona Wiessmark, whose parents survived Nazi concentration camps, and Ilona Kuphal, whose father was a Nazi SS officer, organized the first meeting between children of Nazis and children of Holocaust survivors to explore their guilt, anger, resentment. Their intent was not to focus on the past but to change the future.13 For individuals, and even for communities, traumatic violence becomes part of the current human psyche forged by past oppression.14 Tina Rosenberg writes, "The first lesson I learned was that many countries are not dealing with the past, because the past is still with them." 15 What's needed, then, is not memory but remembering,16 not retrieval of some intact picture but instead a dynamic process of both tying together and distinguishing fragments of past and present.17 What's needed, paradoxically, is a process for reinterpreting what cannot be made sensible, for assembling what cannot be put together, and for separating what cannot be severed from both present and future.

#### The neg’s refusal to engage in modernity attempts to proscribe a single narrative to history, creating cycles of revenge. Countermemory serves as a way to rehabilitate perpetrators and allow healing for victims of atrocity.

Minow ’99 Martha Minow is the Jeremiah Smith, Jr. Professor of Law and the Dean of [Harvard Law School](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvard_Law_School) Between Vengence and Forgiveness Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence 1999 (121-122)

After mass atrocities, victims, perpetrators, and bystanders each require mutual acknowledgment. 20 Yet there are costs of embracing these three roles as if they are sharply demarcated. Few who survive can fit comfortably into simply one of them. No whites in South Africa have clean hands, notes Alex Boraine at the TRC. Many victims also feel guilt—for their survival, for their failures to do more to help others. And yes, perpetrators too are often victims either of systems of ideology and deceit that led them to believe they acted on principle or, later, of simplistic blame that alleviates everyone else of responsibility or even selfscrutiny.

"Hating, blaming and rejecting a group of people does ensure that we do not have to take the risk or responsibility of looking more honestly at the individual members of the group; nor for that matter looking honestly at ourselves and at our deeper feelings. "21

In the context of ordinary criminal law enforcement, prosecutions and punishments that humiliate and isolate offenders rather than reintegrating them do not reduce crime or make the society more secure.22 Philosopher Jean Hampton explains that a successful retributive punishment is one that simultaneously inflicts suffering so as to deny the wrongdoer the position of superiority claimed by his or her violence.23 But such punishment should not itself degrade the wrongdoer so much as render him or her lower than the victim.24

Mass violence is different. Torture, kidnappings, and murders—regimes of rape and terror—call for more severe responses than would any ordinary criminal conduct, even the murder of an individual. And yet, there is no punishment that could express the proper scale of outrage. And if the longer term goals include avoiding cycles of revenge, social reintegration of at least lower level perpetrators should be pursued. In many circumstances, demonizing all on "that side" means demonizing large segments of the society, including many individuals who believed they were acting for a larger good or who acted out of fear or who rationalize their conduct in other ways. To try to understand those beliefs is not a capitulation to evil nor merely a pragmatic effort to avoid laying the ground for further group conflicts. It is a recognition of the filters of meaning and memory that lead people to view their own conduct and beliefs as justifiable. 25

Trials, truth commissions, and reparations each hold potential for affording acknowledgment without locking people into roles as victims or trapping them in feelings of unrelenting hatred. Yet, as this book has explored, each response to atrocity also has sharp limitations, in theory and in practice. Here I revisit all three together and consider still further potential responses. Yet perhaps most crucial for individuals and for nations are the processes for deliberating, constructing, disputing, accepting, rejecting, and reconsidering potential responses to mass violence. The victimized who survive must not be treated as objects without ability to participate in those processes. The fact that some perpetrators elude punishment must not excuse everyone else from demanding a process of response. The public staging of official apologies must not silence those who do not accept them. Respect for individuals must pervade the process as well as the results of public and private responses to mass violence.

#### Hierarchizing oppression crushes coalitional solidarity and obscures the complex over determination of social¶ exploitation - This approach devolves into political moralism, fragmenting progressive politics

**Briskin** women's studies at York University, Toronto, Canada **90 [“**Identity Politics and the Hierarchy of

Oppression: A Comment.” Feminist Review, No. 35 (Summer, 1990)]

The recognition of the class-gender link contests the primacy of class in socialist theory, and provides the basis on which to deconstruct the unified category of'woman' sometimes¶ found in feminist analysis. In both cases, the tendency to seek a clear homogeneity of (class or gender) interests is challenged;¶ difference rather than commonality is placed at the centre; and a politic based on a hierarchy of oppressions¶(the abstract identification of certain oppressions as more salient than others) is rejected. Once the abstract¶ privileging of certain oppressions is removed as a theoretical starting point, the basis is laid for the legitimation¶ of the multiplicity of relations of power based on class, race, ethnicity, gender and sexual orientation.¶ Socialist-feminist theory, then, can provide a framework within which an increasingly sophisticated appreciation of what difference entails can be developed.1 This is neither a¶ 'retreat from class' or a retreat from gender, but a rejection of class and gender reductionism, a reconceptualizing of the relations of power and the introduction of a socialistfeminist¶ historical materialism. Rather than the abstract ranking of the relations of power inherent in class, race, gender, and¶ sexual orientation, the focus is on the ways they intertwine, reinforce and contradict each other in historically¶ specific contexts. Lynne Segal makes a similar point: We should not be looking for the primacy of sex, class or race, nor to¶ isolate them as separate structures when they have fused togetherhistorically. Socialist feminists in Britain need to start from the¶ contemporary reality of a racially and sexually divided capitalist class society. [emphasis in original] (Segal, 1987: 67) The relative strength and import of¶ these relations to groups, individuals and political practice is determined within the context of particular¶ historical conjunctures. This means that the prioritizing of issues**,** a necessity to successful political struggle,¶ does not occur on the basis of abstract principle, but rather in relation to material, economic, political¶ and ideological conditions. This allows socialist-feminist practice to move beyond an internal hierarchy of issues, with those issues having the most apparent¶ class content at the top and those with the least at the bottom. (Weir, 1987: 75-6)2 As we move away from the abstraction of class primacy toward a 'socialist-feminist historicalmaterialism', we move toward a more conjunctural analysis of the relative weight of various relations of power and¶ to a focus on the interrelationships between systems of power. This is not, I might add, an anti-theoretical perspective but one which¶ theorizes from a standpoint, not of class primacy, but of the fundamentally linked character of oppressions. This¶ approach challenges, for example, any form of a base/superstructure model (of which class primacy is a part) in order to liberate an understanding of the¶ relationship between the workplace and the household, and challenges any hierarchy of oppression based on abstraction. Establishing the¶ saliency of gender does not specify the nature of the connection between linked systems of power. Socialist-feminist theory has struggled with the relationship between class and¶ gender, in particular through the 'dual systems' debate which examined the degree to which patriarchy and capitalism are separate or linked systems.3 It is beyond the scope of this¶ comment to delve deeply into this debate, but if we reject the 'class only' approach of socialism and even the 'class first' modification, and focus instead on the intertwining of class¶ and gender; if we analyze, not the separate systems of capitalism and patriarchy, but historically specific forms of patriarchal capitalism; if we study the gendered character of¶ capitalism and the classed character of gender, then we must also repudiate the notion of class and gender as separate systems. A class¶ first approach which favours highlighting the commonality of class interests, as Harriss suggests, inevitably renders invisible the specific gendered and raced experience of class.¶ Experience has definitely demonstrated that this invisibility can also divide people. Finally, the problem of identity politics is not its¶ appeal to identities, for in the first instance such a recognition of diversity is a healthy and critical response to the ideology of an unmediated sister- hood among¶ women, and indeed, to an unmediated set of class interests. Rather the problem is the apolitical way in which identity is¶ mobilized**.** Mary Louise Adams (1989) criticizes identity politics and details the way in which they promote an individualistic, victimist,¶ and personalist stance. In part this apolitical character arises from an over-emphasis on 'experience' inside the women's¶ movement. Experience has been mediated ideologically through the 'personal is political'. The 'personal is political' challenges the¶ public/private split and the overvaluation of the rational and concomitant devaluation of the affective; it validates experience over expertise and, at the same time, depersonalizes/¶ politicizes women's experience; and it provides the basis for a coherent analytical and strategic approach to women's oppression.4 However potentially liberating, the¶ tendency to overemphasize personal experience in the personal/political dialectic intersects with the politics of¶ identity to establish the problematic and competitive hierarchy of oppressions. The identification of certain¶ oppressions as more salient than others promotesbonding on the basis of shared victimization, and exclusion organized¶ around guilt, both of which undermine the possibility of political alliance between feminists.5 **The politics of**¶ **identity**, as currently practised**, often interfere with open strategic debate, and lead to moralism.** For implicit in the¶ operation of the politics of identity is the assumption that a political strategy and, indeed, often political 'correct- ness' flow directly from identity. Identity becomes the basis¶ for political unity. In practice, this can conceal political differences, between lesbians, for example, and, at the same time, overemphasize differences, between lesbians and¶ heterosexual women, for example. Socialist feminists are caught in a particular contradiction in relation to identity politics. On the one hand a socialist-feminist analysis of¶ diversity based on class/race/gender/sexual orientation helps promote an understanding of the significance of these differences. But socialist-feminist practice must¶ resist the mobilization of identity in an exclusively personalist and experiential way and encourage a practice which reflects the systemic intertwining of identities. Gender and¶ race are not just 'identities' but systems of power as deeply embedded as class that cannot be understood in isolation from one another. Strategically, socialist feminists¶ must argue against the tendency to **excessive fragmentation,** and in favour of building sisterhood on the basis of difference, both of which are¶ expressed organizationally in the women's movement, not through large homogeneous political organiz- ations, but rather through alliances and coalitions.¶ Indeed, the ability to build sisterhood on the basis of difference may be central to the survival of the women's movement as a movement for change.¶

#### Perm: deconstruct all interlocking forms of subordination

Alexis Pauline **Gumbs***, Raleigh / Durham, NC ,* **08** [“Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of

Coalition”*http://problemchylde.wordpress.com/2008/03/28/beside-my-sister-facing-the-enemy-legal-theory-out-of-coalition-mari-j-matsuda/]*

As we look at these patterns of oppression, we may come to learn, finally and most importantly, that all forms of subordination are interlocking and¶ mutually reinforcing. The way I try to understand the interconnection of all forms of subordination is through a¶ method I call “ask the other question.” When I see something that looks racist, I ask, “Where is the patriarchy in¶ this?” When I see something that looks sexist, I ask, “Where is the heterosexism in this?” When I see something that looks homophobic, I ask, “Where are the class interests in¶ this?” Working in coalition forces us to look for both the obvious and non-obvious relationships of domination,¶ helping us to realize that no form of subordination ever stands alone. If this is true, we’ve asked each other, then isn’t it also true that¶ dismantling any one form of subordination is impossible without dismantling every other**?** And more and more,¶ particularly in the women of color movement, the answer is that “no person is free until the last and least of us is free.”

#### Perm do the alt through a lens of deconstruction-aff Is pre-req- we perform a deconstruction in the round, and deconstructing how we view natives and their oppressors as academics is key to make change- Thomson and derrida.

**Derrida’s politics explicitly encourage action- voting aff IS voting for real grassroots change, not just academic pandering of the alt  
Miller 09** (J. Harris, *Derrida’s Politics of Autoimmunity,* Originally published 2008 in Discourse Journal, updated May 23, 2009, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/dis/summary/v030/30.1-2.miller.html>)

**Nor did Derrida’s politics remain purely theoretical**. He did not¶ remain in his armchair in his study or safely before his computer¶ screen. He took stands. **He acted politically, often in ways that were¶ risky**. He suffered anti-Semitic persecution by the French in Algeria¶ during World War II. He resigned from Tel Quel because he was¶ opposed to Maoism. He chose never to join the Communist Party, at¶ a time when it was difficult not to join it, if you were, as he was, an¶ intellectual on the left. He took a public and somewhat unpopular¶ stand of qualified solidarity during the student rebellions in France¶ in 1968. Years later, Derrida was arrested in Czechoslovakia for giving¶ a clandestine seminar there. He attacked Apartheid vigorously¶ and visited Mandela in South Africa. Specters of Marx is dedicated to¶ Chris Hani, an avowed communist and a hero of the resistance¶ against apartheid. Hani was assassinated in South Africa on 10 April 1993, just as Derrida was finishing his book on Marx. That book was¶ given as lectures at the University of California at Riverside on 22¶ and 23 April 1993. Derrida spoke out in the United States against¶ U.S. legalization of capital punishment. He accused us, correctly,¶ vigorously, and publicly, of being the only so-called first world country¶ still to have capital punishment. He harbored a homeless African¶ immigrant in his home outside Paris, allowing that man to use the¶ Derrida address as his own to avoid deportation. At that time in¶ France, an immigrant could stay if he or she had a valid address.¶ **Derrida did not just sit around and think or write about politics,¶ however complex contradictory, aporetic, and ambiguous he may¶ have seen political action to be. That should never be forgotten. Derrida is in many places quite explicit and specific about our¶ obligation to act as well as to think politically.** Here is one example¶ in “Force of Law” (1992). In this case, Derrida declares our obligation¶ to pass new emancipatory laws to deal with a whole series of specific¶ contemporary social problems:¶ Left to itself, the incalculable and giving idea of justice is always very close¶ to the bad, even to the worst for it can always be reappropriated by the¶ most perverse calculation [le calcul le plus pervers]. It’s always possible.2 . . .¶ This requirement [L’ordre de ce il faut] does not properly belong either to¶ justice or law. It only belongs to either of these two domains by exceeding¶ each one in the direction of the other. Politicization, for example, is interminable¶ even if it cannot and should not ever be total. To keep this from¶ being a truism or a triviality, we must recognize in it the following consequence:¶ **each advance in politicization obliges one to reconsider, and so¶ to reinterpret, the very foundations of law** [les fondements mêmes du droit]¶ **such as they had previously been calculated or delimited.** This was true for¶ example in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, in the abolition of slavery,¶ in all the emancipatory battles that remain and will have to remain in¶ progress, everywhere in the world, for men and for women. Nothing¶ seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal. . . . But¶ beyond these identified territories of juridico-politicization on the grand¶ geopolitical scale, beyond all self-serving interpretations [au-delà de tous les¶ détournements et arraisonnements intéressés], beyond all determined and particular¶ reappropriations of international law, other **areas must constantly¶ open up that at first seem like secondary or marginal areas. This marginality¶ also signifies that a violence, indeed a terrorism and other forms of¶ hostage-taking, are at work** (the examples closest to us would be found in¶ the area of laws on the teaching and practice of languages, the legitimization¶ of canons, the military use of scientific research, abortion,¶ euthanasia, problems of organ transplant, extrauterine conception, bioengineering¶ [Derrida might now have said “stem-cell research” (JHM)],¶ medical experimentation, the social treatment of AIDS, the macro-or¶ micropolitics of drugs, the homeless, and so on, without forgetting, of¶ course, the treatment of what we call animal life, animality [l’énorme question¶ dite de l’animalité].3

**Perm – do the plan as an appropriation of autoimmunity to intervene on empire. The K's totalizing demand of purity is the embodiment of western binary thought that is the root cause of their harms. Appropriating European philosophy is the best method to solve and allow a coming-together to grieve the violence of empire.**

Molly **Blyth 2013**(Review of “The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism” by Jodi A. Byrd. “Postcolonial Text” Vol. 8, no. 1, 2013.) Blyth has been a professor of Indigenous Studies at Trent University since 1986. She is a recipient of the Symons Award for Excellence in Teaching.

Byrd demonstrates an authoritative, wide-ranging familiarity with some of the most important Euro-Western theorists from this and the last century. Thus, *The Transit of Empire* offers a new, groundbreaking example of what the late Choctaw, Cherokee and Irish critic and author, Louis Owens, has termed a “mixed-blood” text. **By incorporating, critiquing, and indeed appropriating critical and cultural theory**, it resists“the dialectics of settler/native, master/slave, colonizer/colonized that all too often inform calls for reparations and decolonization” (xxxvii). Certainly, **such binary thinking, a trademark of Western forms of cultural colonization**, is inscribed in much of the writing in the field. Canon builders during the 1990ssuch as Lakota writer, Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, Cherokee scholar, Jace Weaver, and Osage critic and author, Robert Warrior,adopted a form of tribal nationalism—one that required American Indian scholars to rely only on Indigenous forms of knowledge in their critical writing. **An “Us and Them” mentality resulted**that continues today. Byrd brilliantly undercuts this thinking, **appropriating Euro-Western critical theory in order to celebrate Southwestern Indigenous philosophy and traditional knowledge. Such appropriation has always been an indispensible tool of resistance, its deployment working to revitalize rather than assimilate Indigenous cultures.** This strategy, according to Byrd, also characterizes the work of a younger generation of scholars such as Dale Turner (Teme-Augama Anishnabai), Daniel Heath Justice (Cherokee), and Chris Anderson (Michif), for example. The most recent writing of Warrior also destabilizes the native/settler dichotomy by calling for a conversation between their different philosophies and the need for **“both an inward and outward turn” by Indigenous intellectuals**(xxviii). A foremost scholar to whom Byrd turns in *The Transit of Empire*is the Anishnabai theorist, storyteller, and poet Gerald Vizenor, whose “mixed-blood” texts offer a similar display of authority in their engagement with and appropriation of Euro-Western theory. Byrd’s *Transit of Empire* deserves to be included in this canon of writers in the emergent field of American Indian and Indigenous Studies. While I know my students will struggle to engage with this highly theoretical text and its mind-bending methodology, Byrd has convinced me that their subsequent intellectual and, indeed, emotional headaches are a necessary part of her project of decolonization (xxvi). “Indigenous decolonization,” as she argues, “restores life and **allows settler, arrivant, and native to apprehend and grieve together the violence of U.S. Empire”** (229). For my students then, along with us all, sorrow and pain are part of the journey we must take towards restorative justice for Indigenous peoples in North America.

#### These academy arguments don’t make any sense – Vietnam didn’t represent a specific time when the academy was absent from protest.

#### Taking a stand against hegemonic practices like indefinite detention must start outside of the state. We have personal agency in this space that can be used to reclaim the academy. All of their evidence is couched in status-quo notions of the academy, but that is not how the academy must be. Deconstruction can overcome those problems.

Arrigo and Williams ‘00

(Bruce A., Christopher R., professor of @ the University of North Carolina, associate professor of criminology @ the University of West Georgia, Possibility of Democratic Justice and the "Gift" of the Majority : On Derrida, Deconstruction, and the Search for Equality Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice)

This article conceptually explores the problem of democratic justice in the form of legislated equal rights for minority citizen groups. Following Derrida's critique of Western logic and thought, at issue is the (im)possibility of justice for under- and nonrepresented constituencies. Derrida's socioethical treatment of justice, law, hospitality, and community suggests that the majority bestows a gift (ostensible sociopolitical empowerment); however, the ruse of this gift is that the giver affirms an economy of narcissism and reifies the hegemony and power of the majority. This article concludes by speculating on the possibility of justice and equality informed by an affirmative postmodern framework. A cultural politics of difference, contingent universalities, undecidability, dialogical pedagogy, border crossings, and constitutive thought would underscore this transformative and deconstructive agenda. The impediments to establishing democratic justice in contemporary American society have caused a national paralysis; one that has reck­lessly spawned an aporetic existence for minorities.2 The entrenched ideo­logical complexities afflicting under- and nonrepresented groups (e.g., poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, crime) at the hands of political, legal, cul­tural, and economic power elites have produced counterfeit, perhaps even fraudulent, efforts at reform: Discrimination and inequality in opportunity prevail (e.g., Lynch & Patterson, 1996). The misguided and futile initiatives of the state, in pursuit of transcending this public affairs crisis, have fostered a reification, that is, a reinforcement of divisiveness. This time, however, minority groups compete with one another for recognition, affirmation, and identity in the national collective psyche (Rosenfeld, 1993). What ensues by way of state effort, though, is a contemporaneous sense of equality for all and a near imperceptible endorsement of inequality; a silent conviction that the majority still retains power.4 The "gift" of equality, procured through state legislative enactments as an emblem of democratic justice, embodies true (legitimated) power that re­mains nervously secure in the hands of the majority.5 The ostensible empow­erment of minority groups is a facade; it is the ruse of the majority gift. What exists, in fact, is a simulacrum (Baudrillard, 1981,1983) of equality (and by extension, democratic justice): a pseudo-sign image (a hypertext or simula­tion) of real sociopolitical progress. For the future relationship between equality and the social to more fully embrace minority sensibilities, calculated legal reform efforts in the name of equality must be displaced and the rule and authority of the status quo must be decentered. Imaginable, calculable equality is self-limiting and self-referential. Ultimately, it is always (at least) one step removed from true equality and, therefore, true justice.6 The ruse of the majority gift currently operates under the assumption of a presumed empowerment, which it confers on minority populations. Yet, the presented power is itself circumscribed by the stifling horizons of majority rule with their effects. Thus, the gift can only be con­strued as falsely eudemonic: An avaricious, although insatiable, pursuit of narcissistic legitimacy supporting majority directives. The commission (bestowal) of power to minority groups or citizens through prevailing state reformatory efforts underscores a polemic with implications for public affairs and civic life. We contend that the avenir (i.e., the "to come") of equality as an (in)calculable, (un)recognizable destination in search of democratic justice is needed. However, we argue that this dis­placement of equality is unattainable if prevailing juridico-ethico-political conditions (and societal consciousness pertaining to them) remain fixed, stagnant, and immutable. In this article, we will demonstrate how the gift of the majority is problem­atic, producing, as it must, a narcissistic hegemony, that is, a sustained empowering of the privileged, a constant relegitimation of the powerful.7 Relying on Derrida's postmodern critique of Eurocentric logic and thought, we will show how complicated and fragmented the question of establishing democratic justice is in Western cultures, especially in American society. We will argue that what is needed is a relocation of the debate about justice and difference from the circumscribed boundaries of legal redistributive dis­course on equality to the more encompassing context of alterity, undecidability, cultural plurality, and affirmative postmodern thought.

#### Refusal to investigate racism in this space makes politics impossible. Offsets all their offense.

Giroux ‘11

Henry A Giroux, Truthout, Occupy Colleges Now: Students as the New Public Intellectuals, 21 November 2011, <http://truth-out.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=5046:occupy-colleges-now--students-as-the-new-public-intellectuals>

Of course, such a position is at odds with those intellectuals who have retreated into arcane discourses that offer the cloistered protection of the professional recluse. Making few connections with audiences outside of the academy or to the myriad issues that bear down on everyday lives, many academics became increasingly irrelevant, while humanistic inquiry suffers the aftershocks of flagging public support. The Occupy Wall Street protesters have refused this notion of the deracinated, if not increasingly irrelevant, notion of academics and students as disinterested intellectuals. They are not alone. Refusing the rewards of apolitical professionalism or obscure specialization so rampant on university campuses, Roy has pointed out that intellectuals need to ask themselves some very "uncomfortable questions about our values and traditions, our vision for the future, our responsibilities as citizens, the legitimacy of our 'democratic institutions,' the role of the state, the police, the army, the judiciary, and the intellectual community."[[1]](http://truth-out.org/index.php#1) Similarly, Scarry points to the difficulty of seeing an injury and injustice, the sense of futility of one's own small efforts, and the special difficulty of lifting complex ideas into the public sphere.[[2]](http://truth-out.org/index.php#2) Derrida has raised important questions about the relationship between critique and the very nature of the university and the humanities, as when he writes: The university without condition does not, in fact, exist, as we know only too well. Nevertheless, in principle and in conformity with its declared vocation, its professed essence, it should remain an ultimate place of critical resistance - and more than critical - to all the power of dogmatic and unjust appropriation.[[3]](http://truth-out.org/index.php#3)